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CIVIL WARS
This paper seeks to answer a simple question: when do regional powers get involved in civil
wars? Some civil wars see a significant involvement of regional actors, while others show a
remarkable level of isolation. What explains this difference? This research answers this
question by looking at two case studies: the Algerian civil war (1991-2002) and the Syrian
civil war (2011-up to date). The paper identifies and develops five factors of regional
involvement. These are: capabilities, regional dynamics, country's relevance, regional
security issues/containment and domestic-external links. Civil wars are today one of the most
prominent and deadly forms of conflict, and this paper contributes to understanding the
important but understudied issue of regional involvement.





This paper seeks to answer a simple question: when do regional powers get involved in civil
wars? Civil  wars are  today one of the most prominent  and deadly forms of conflict:  the
Rwandan civil war, the civil war in the Balkans as well as the same Syrian civil war are listed
among the deadliest conflicts in the aftermath of WWII. The intervention of regional powers
frequently leads to increases in the level of violence, the quality and quantity of weapons
used and also affects the potential for solutions. Whereas some civil wars see a significant
involvement of regional actors, others show a remarkable level of isolation. What explains
this difference? Is it a consequence of the specific developments of the civil wars themselves,
or is it caused by regional and international factors? 
This paper compares two case studies: the Algerian civil war of 1991-20021 and the current
Syrian civil war. These two cases have been chosen because they present opposite levels of
external powers’ involvement despite similarities between the countries where the conflict
took  place.  The  Algerian  civil  war  shows  a  striking  level  of  isolation  from  external
interference, while the present Syrian civil war is characterized by a very high degree of
external involvement. Despite the presence of a rich literature on civil wars, few studies seek
to explain the disparity in the role played by regional powers. The aim of this paper is to
assess what drives regional actors’ involvement in civil wars. Under which conditions are
states more likely to intervene (whether directly or indirectly) in civil wars? This research
develops  five  factors  of  regional  involvement.  They  are:  (i)  capabilities,  (ii)  regional
dynamics,   (iii)  country’s  relevance,  (iv)  regional  security  issues/containment  and  (v)
1Scholars disagree on when the civil war terminated since acts of violence connected to the conflict continued 
up to the mid-2000s.
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domestic-external links.  These have been elaborated by analysing the development of the
Algerian and Syrian civil wars. 
 This paper will  first look at  the existing literature on civil  wars in order to pinpoint the
concepts  that  are  most  relevant  to  this  analysis.  It  will  then  briefly  discuss  the  main
dimension of the analysis: the regional one. The second section of the paper looks at the two
case studies: the Algerian civil War 1991-2002 and the current Syrian civil war. The third
section introduces five factors of regional involvement and discusses how they apply to case
studies.  The  fourth  section  elaborates  the  findings  of  the  comparative  analysis.  The  last
section contains some final remarks.
Revisiting external involvement in civil wars
This paper draws on two separate bodies of literature. The first is the literature on civil wars,
their development and outcomes; the second is the literature on regional security studies. The
literature on civil wars is rich and varied: particularly  developed is the subfield dealing with
the motives of actors in civil wars. An example of this  is  The Logic of Violence in Civil
Wars[ CITATION Kal06 \l 1040 ]. And this study also provides a definition of civil war that
will be used in this work: 
Armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject
to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities.[CITATION Kal06 \p 14 \l 1040 ]
The work of Kalyvas and others have significantly improved our understanding of different
aspects of civil wars. Most of these works do not specifically deal with regional involvement
in civil wars, but deal with cognate issues and complement the argument of this article. One
example is Christia [CITATION Chr12 \n  \l 1040 ], that provides a theory-based explanation
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of how (domestic) actors choose or change alliances in civil wars. Particularly developed is
the literature on conflict resolution. Among these the work of I William Zartman[CITATION
Zar96 \n  \t  \l 1040 ] [CITATION Zar02 \n  \t  \l 1040 ] deserves particular attention because of its influence
on the whole field of civil war studies. Another branch of the literature[CITATION Ste02 \l
1040  ] deals  with  the  aftermath  of  peace  agreements,  and  particularly  with  the
implementation phase. Several studies deal with intervention by the international community.
An example  of  this  part  of  the  literature  is  provided by the  “Civil  wars,  insecurity  and
intervention” edited volume [ CITATION Wal99 \l 1040 ]. The chapters contained provide an
interesting insight to the domestic-international relation by using a theoretical approach based
on the security dilemma. Yet their contribution to the topic of this study is limited by the fact
that the case studies do not focus on the role of regional  powers but only on the  intervention
by the international community. 
This study seeks to contribute more specifically to the literature on regional involvement in
civil wars. Given how often civil wars become regionalized, and how much this affects the
development  and  potential  solution  of  these  conflicts,  the  shortage  of  studies  dealing
specifically  with  “when  and  why”  regional  powers  get  involved  in  civil  wars  is  rather
surprising.  The literature on external involvement in civil wars focuses to a large extent on
when  external  involvement  is  successful[CITATION  Reg96  \t   \l  1040  ] or  whether  it
increases or shortens the length of the conflicts[CITATION Reg02 \t  \l 1040 ].  Regan and
Aydin [CITATION Reg06 \n  \l 1040 ] address the relation between kind of intervention and
effect on the development of civil wars: they conclude that diplomatic interventions tend to
shorten the duration of conflict. This branch of literature gives important insights into the
development and potential solution of civil wars, but its contribution to this study is limited
as they mainly deal with the consequences of regional involvement rather than its causes.
Similarly, Gent  [CITATION Gen08 \n  \l 1040 ] shows how intervention on the side of the
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regime is under some circumstances less effective than intervention on the side of the rebels.
These  studies  are  broadly  more  concerned  with  what  happens  when  external  actors  get
involved rather than why and when they do; their contribution to the topic analysed by this
study is therefore also limited.  
Ethnic conflict has received particular attention in the literature. Akhaba et al.  [CITATION
Akh08 \n  \l 1040 ]focus on why ethnic conflicts attract external support from states. They
focus in particular on whether discrimination of minorities plays a role in increasing external
intervention, concluding  “that rebellion elicits external support, and is stimulated by it as
well”[CITATION Akh08 \n  \l 1040 ]. Carment and James[CITATION Car04 \n  \l 1040 ]
analyse which kind of states are more likely to get involved in ethnic strives: they conclude
that those with low domestic constraints and ethnic uniformity tend to be more belligerent.
Whilst the findings of both these works are not incompatible with that of this research, their
contribution to cases where ethnic divisions are either not a central factor (like the Algerian
case) or are one among many aspects (like Syria) is rather limited. 
More relevant  to this  analysis  is  Kathman’s  work  [CITATION Kat10 \n   \l  1040 ].  This
research focuses on neighbouring countries’ involvement in civil wars. The author’s main
conclusion, that neighbouring states are more directly threatened by the occurrence of a civil
war, is in line with the predictions of this study on the risk of spill-over. Aydin [CITATION
Ayd12 \n  \l 1040 ] bases her explanation of military intervention on economic liberalism and
when analysing civil wars specifically she concludes that states are likely to intervene if they
have economic interests at stake (like in other conflicts) but less likely to intervene militarily.
Shirkey [CITATION Shi16 \n  \l 1040 ] focuses on how information about the development
of a civil war effects leaders’ choices to intervene. His study shows how unexpected events
(particularly  military  ones)  increase  the  likelihood  of  external  intervention.  There  is  no
obvious discordancy between Shirkey’s argument and the one of this study- also due to the
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fact that the two works deal with rather different topics; despite this the correlation between
unexpected  military events and involvement does not appear in the Syrian and Algerian
cases. Forsberg [CITATION For16 \n  \l 1040 ] analyses civil wars’ clustering and contagion.
Forsberg’s study deals with the opposite relation than the one analysed  by this study --  how
the development of civil wars influences regions. Forsberg’s contribution is therefore rather
complementary to the one of this paper. 
The second body of literature relevant to this work is that of regional security studies. The
emphasis on the regional dimension, and particularly on regional security studies represents
one  of  the  main  developments  in  the  study  of  international  relations  in  the  last  two
decades[  CITATION Faw09 \l  1040 ][  CITATION Kat05 \l  1040 ].   Buzan and Waever
provide a useful definition of region, which will be adopted in this analysis:
Regions, almost however defined, must be composed of geographically clustered sets of such
units - (states) - and these clusters must be embedded in a larger system, which has a
structure of its own. [CITATION Buz05 \p 27 \l 1040 ]
Regions are the main analytical level of RSCT (Regional Security Complex Theory). This
theory  maintains  that  security  threats  are  often  regional  and  sub-regional,  rather  than
international or domestic, and the regional dimension is therefore the ideal level on which to
analyse  them[CITATION  Buz05  \l  1040  ].  Buzan  and  Waever  crucially  also  divide
“macroregions” into smaller sub-regions. Regional actors are the first ones to be affected by
the occurrence of a civil war and the ones that have more at stake in the outcome of the
conflict. Crucially, regional actors are also the ones that more frequently get involved in the
civil  wars.   This research therefore focuses on the regional dimension of civil  wars,  and
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particularly on regional involvement in civil wars2. In this context, the Algerian and Syrian
cases also offer some important insights into the interaction between domestic, sub-regional
and regional dimensions. It is worth noticing how regional involvement in civil wars can take
different forms. It can be indirect (including financing, supporting and training one or more
of the parties involved in a conflict) or direct (when external actors intervene militarily in the
country where the civil war is taking place)3.  
 This study adopts a comparative case oriented method and specifically one:” that uses a
case oriented strategy involving cases with different outcomes. The cases may appear very
similar and yet experience different outcomes”[CITATION Rag87 \p 47 \l 1040 ]. The goal of
this comparison is to analyse what aspects explain regional power involvement in civil wars.
Five factors of regional involvement are put forward by this study4. These five aspects are
discussed in section two and developed using the two cases studies in section three. The two
case studies are therefore used to “generate theory” on the causes of regional involvement in
civil wars.   The two case studies (the Algerian Civil war of the 90s and the Syrian Civil War)
have been chosen because they present strikingly different levels of regional involvement
amid  similarities  in  both  the  conflicts’ developments  and  aspects  of  the  two  countries’
political systems.  The case studies will therefore provide a good indication of the effect of
the five factors on regional powers’ involvement. 
This study relies on the aforementioned literatures on civil wars and regional security studies.
The combination of these two bodies of literature provides the study with a solid theoretical
background.  The growing literature on regions  and regional  security  studies  in  particular
2The line between civil war and “interstate war” is often blurred  as shown by cases such as the Lebanese Civil 
war (1975-90) or the Spanish civil war (1936-39). 
3Involvement and intervention are in this analysis interchangeable. . 
4 This analysis does not deal with single state’s foreign policies: it does therefore not discuss why each actor 
decided to intervene (or not intervene) in the two civil wars. This undoubtedly interesting aspect is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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provides a critical  discussion of some of the key concepts used by this analysis,  such as
security spill-over or containment. This study uses mostly secondary sources for the two case
studies. In the case of Algeria,  a broad literature on the civil war exists. This includes a set of
works on modern Algeria, such as Ruedy [CITATION Rue05 \n  \l 1040 ], that provided this
study with the necessary historical framework. Other works such as Martinez  [CITATION
Mar05 \n  \l 1040 ] or Roberts [CITATION Rob02 \n  \l 1040 ] offer more specific insights on
the origins and development of the civil war in the North African country. In the case of
Syria, as the civil war is still taking place, the number of academic works dealing with the
topic of this study is relatively low, albeit of good quality. Philipps’ [CITATION Phi161 \n  \l
1040 ] is the first study dealing  systematically with the international relations of the conflict.
This lack of academic sources has led the author to integrate more contemporary sources such
as newspapers articles and reports. The inclusion of these sources helped limiting the gaps
created by the lack of academic literature on the Syrian case. The study also uses a limited
number of primary sources. These are mainly leader’s statements reported by newspapers or
main media outlets. The author had initially planned to include a wider range of primary
sources, but decided against it because of two reasons. The first is the aim of this paper, that
seeks to analyse systemic factors that lead to regional involvement rather than the reason that
led each single power to intervene. The second is the nature of many leaders’ statements on
such  a  sensitive  topic.  Most  of  the  statements   by  regional  actors  emphasise  the
“humanitarian” motives of involvement in the conflict, downplaying the policy factors that
led  to  their  involvement.  For  this  two  reasons,  only  leaders’ statements  that  are  non-
controversial and have an obvious added value had been included in the study.  
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The two case studies: civil wars in Algeria and Syria
The two case studies analysed are the Algerian civil war that took place between 1991 and
2002 and the current Syrian civil war (2011-present). These two civil wars, and indeed the
countries in which they have occurred, share several important features. The first similarity is
in regimes and state structures. Both Syria and Algeria were (at the time of the start of their
respective  civil  wars)  military  regimes,  both  with  strongly  centralized  state
structures[CITATION Per80 \l 1040 ]. Secondly, there was a certain degree of ideological
affinity between the regimes that ruled the two countries at the beginning of the civil wars.
The Algerian FNL can  be described as a nationalist movement with Pan-Arab and “leftist”
(mainly  socialist)  elements.  The  Ba’th  power  that  took  over  in  Damascus  in  1963  was
(together with its Iraqi counterpart) the clearest political articulation of Pan-Arab ideology5.
Both regimes were part of that Arab left of the “progressive republics”. From the second half
of the 1960s onwards, both regimes adopted measures that antagonized Islamist forces in the
country.  In  the  case  of  Algeria,  the  1971  “agrarian  revolution”  calling  for  a  large
nationalization process at  the expense of large traditional landowners was perceived as a
direct threat against the religious establishment[CITATION Rob02 \p 47 \l 1040 ]. In the case
of Syria, the regime’s Pan-Arab ideology alienated the most religious sectors of society. In
the late 1970s discontent with the regime erupted in an open insurrection that threatened to
oust the Ba’th party. In both cases Islamist forces represented a significant component of the
opposition. In the case of Algeria the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was the most significant
opposition group even before the start  of the civil  war;  in the case of Syria,  the protests
against the regime did not immediately have an exclusively “religious” connotation, but the
role of Islamist forces grew rapidly. Finally, while the events that led to the start of the civil
wars were different, some similarities can be found here too. Both countries went through a
5 The 1970 “Corrective movement” that followed the takeover of Hafiz Al-Assad imposed a less radical version 
of Ba’thism, more open towards free market and capital.
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peaceful  protests-repression-violence  cycle,  as  the  next  section  will  note.  In  the  case  of
Algeria,  the  regime reacted  to  the  1988 protests  by  opening towards  a  more  democratic
system, but then retracted when faced with a strong FIS success in the parliamentary election
amid fears of an Islamist take over. In Syria the regime never conceded similar openings to
the  opposition,  but  in  both  cases  the  violent  repression  appears  to  have  radicalized  the
opposition forces and pushed the country towards a full-blown conflict.    
Despite  these similarities,  the two civil  wars present  a  striking difference in  the level  of
regional powers’ involvement. In the Algerian case, the level of external involvement in the
civil war is remarkably low. While the regime accused different countries (particularly Iran,
Morocco  and  Sudan)  of  supporting  the  Islamist  militants,  the  main  studies  on  the  topic
suggest that regional involvement in the civil war was very low6. The Syrian case saw the
immediate involvement of regional actors, and a constant increase throughout the conflict.
Recent works on the conflict confirm that external powers got involved in the conflict very
early, and that this involvement significantly shaped the trajectory of the conflict[ CITATION
Phi161  \l  1040  ].  What  explains  this  contrast  between  the  two  conflicts?  Why  are  we
witnessing  so  much  regional  involvement  in  the  Syrian  case  and  relatively  little  in  the
Algerian one? The next section will provide some historical background to the start of the
civil war. 
Civil wars in Syria and Algeria
When the Algerian civil war started in late 1991, memories of the country’s turbulent path to
independence were still relatively fresh. The Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), the party
that led Algeria to independence from Paris, remained firmly in charge in a one party system
till the end of the 1980s. Roberts[CITATION Rob02 \n  \t  \l 1040 ] shows how the consensus
6Prince Sultan Ibn Abzulazziz in a statement published by Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on 26th of March 1991 revealed 
that his country financed the Islamist movements in Algeria and Tunisia [CITATION Mar05 \p 23 \l 1040 ] 
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that had led to the independence of the country was by then largely broken. As the Algerian
regime progressively moved to the left under president Boumedienne[CITATION Wil96 \l
1040 ] and some Islamist forces radicalized, the pact on which the struggle against the French
occupiers was based crumbled. In order to address the growing discontent in the country,
clearly  manifested  during  the  1988  revolts,  President  Chadli  Bendjedid  put  forward  a
comprehensive reform plan[ CITATION LeS10 \l  1040 ]. The opening up led to the first
openly contested parliamentary election in December 1991, which resulted in a first-round
landslide victory for the main Islamist party, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). This party in
1990-91 was :”The quintessential prototype of the Islamist reformist movement, operating
within  a  non-violent  framework  and  searching  to  obtain  power  through  democratic
means”[CITATION Ent05 \p 211 \l 1040 ]. Fearing that the second round of elections would
result in a further victory for the Islamists, the Algerian military stepped in, deposed President
Benjedid and ended the brief Algerian democratic experience. A five people directory was
appointed, the FIS outlawed and the moderates (called the conciliators) within the secular
front excluded from power[CITATION Mar05 \l 1040 ].
The coup d’état further polarized the situation and started a protest-repression-protest cycle
that led to a full-blown civil war. The events of the early 90s also created significant division
among  Islamist  forces.  Disenchanted  with  the  democratic  process  and persecuted  by  the
military committee now in power, several supporters of the FIS joined military groups (the
main ones being the Armed Islamic Group, or GIA, and the Movement for Islamic State). The
extremism and indiscriminate violence against civilians carried out by the GIA in particular
led to the creation of groups such as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), active in the Western
part of the country and loyal to the FIS. Ruedy[CITATION Rue05 \n  \t  \l 1040 ]  estimates
that the peak in the number of fighters was reached in 1996 with a number in the region of
25,000. The Algerian civil  war lasted about  ten years and caused a number of casualties
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estimated to be around 150000[CITATION Rue05 \l 1040 ]. It resulted in a substantial victory
for the Algerian military forces that managed to suppress the Islamist revolt and re-establish
their control over the entire country. 
Syria’s trajectory towards the civil war presents interesting parallels with the one of Algeria.
When the wave of protests of the so-called  “Arab Spring” hit the region in early 2011, Syria
was initially unaffected by the demonstrations. When the protests started in the country, it
was the regime’s violent reaction that radicalized what was initially a peaceful movement
asking for reforms rather than regime change. In fact, during the first months the protests
consisted  mainly  of  peaceful  demonstrations,  with  few  confirmed  cases  of  opposition
violence[CITATION Ali11 \l  1040 ].  The first  military opposition group, the Free Syrian
Army, was founded in July 2011 and carried out its first significant military actions in late
2011[CITATION Gua11 \l 1040 ]. Early 2012 saw the formation and development of several
Islamist militias, including the Nusra front (Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria) and Ahrar Al-Sham.
By the second half of 2012 the Syrian regime had lost control of large swathes of territory
and  the  clashes  of  previous  months  had  turned  into  a  full-blown civil  war.  Despite  the
frequent suggestions of an imminent regime collapse[ CITATION Bla12 \l 1040 ], the regime
was able to absorb significant losses of territory and maintain control of its own core regions.
Crucial to the achievement of this goal was (and still is) the support obtained by its regional
allies. The Islamic Republic of Iran had a long established partnership with the Ba’ath regime
in  Syria,  dating  back to  the  days  of  the  Iranian Revolution.  The Islamic republic  rallied
behind its ally from the outset of the civil war: as early as February 2012 the foreign minister
of Tehran  Ali Akbar Salehi when addressing his Syrian counterpart declared that: “Tehran's
support for reforms implemented by Damascus is  aimed at  resolving the on-going unrest
in Syria..and it  categorically  supports  the  Syrian  government  against  internal  and foreign
pressures”  [CITATION Pre12 \l 1040 ] Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah proved to be
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crucial  in  strengthening  the  Assad  regime.  An  Institute  for  the  Study  of  War
report[ CITATION Ful13 \l 1040 ] showed how already in May 2013 the involvement of
Iranian troops went further than simple military assistance to their Syrian counterparts7. The
role of Iranian forces and Iranian trained militias has increased significantly since, together
with Hezbollah’s involvement[CITATION Sul13 \l 1040 ]. The opposition on the other hand
counted throughout the civil war on the support (mainly indirect) of several regional actors,
as well as on the influx of high numbers of foreign fighters from the Arab world and beyond.
In November 2011, the Arab League under the lead of Saudi Arabia and Qatar approved
sanctions on the Syrian regime.  By February 2012 then-foreign minister of Saudi Arabia
Prince Saud Al-Faisal was openly calling to supply weapons to Syrian rebels that “needed
them to defend themselves” [ CITATION Spe12 \l 1040 ].Turkey was initially unprepared for
the turmoil in the neighbouring country. In August 2011 minister Davotoglu was dispatched
to  Damascus  to  broker  a  negotiation  process  led  by  Ankara.  Bashar’s  refusal  not  only
signalled the end of the short-lived rapprochement between the two countries, but was also an
unprecedented slap to Erdogan’s personal prestige. The relations between the two leaderships
suddenly  turned  sour,  with  Turkey  soon  becoming  one  of  the  main  supporters  of  the
opposition to the Syrian regime. Within a few months from the start of the uprising, virtually
all regional states had meddled with the development of the Syrian civil war. Whether by
supporting proxy groups in the countries (like the aforementioned states, but also countries
such  as  Jordan),  or  striking  specific  targets  (such  as  Israel  did)  most  regional  countries
intervened  (and still intervene) in the Syrian conflict, making it a regional war as much as a
civil war.   
7 The regime was also able to count on an extra-regional ally in Russia. 
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Factors of regional involvement
This section will introduce five factors of regional involvement based on the cases of the civil
wars in  Syria  and Algeria.  The first  two aspects,  capabilities  and regional  dynamics,  are
“external”: they do not depend on developments within the country where the war is taking
place. Country’s relevance refers to the country where the civil  war is taking place,  as it
represents the country’s importance within the regional context. Regional security issues is an
internal factor,  as it  refers to the potential  threats  emerging from the civil  war.  The final
indicator, domestic/external relations, “connects” the domestic and the regional dimensions.
Capabilities
This factor refers to whether regional actors have the resources and means to intervene in the
civil  war  in  a  significant  way.  States  will  need economic,  technological  and particularly
military resources to get involved in a civil war (even more so if the involvement is direct).
The kind of resources that a state needs to possess to be able to influence the outcome of a
civil  war  will  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  civil  war  itself,  the  kind  of  weapons  and
technologies being used by warring parties, the geography of the territory where the civil war
is taking place. Military capabilities in particular are not an absolute value, but are related to
specific situations[CITATION Ran00 \l 1040 ].  In some cases states simply do not have the
military, technological or economic means to get seriously involved in a war taking place in
another country. This can provide effective “insulation” from external actors’ involvement.   
The  economic  and  military  capabilities  of  main  actors  in  the  Levant-Gulf  region  and
Maghreb  region  at  the  start  of  the  respective  conflicts  were  different,  and  so  were  the
geopolitical features of the two civil wars. The main regional actors in the Maghreb had, at
the time of the Algerian civil war, relatively low economic and military capabilities. Morocco
was involved in a long and costly war with the Western Saharan Polisario Front. Libya’s
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involvement in the Chadian civil war had already reduced Qaddafi’s capabilities to influence
the  outcome  of  another  scenario,  and  the  Libyan  economy,  and  particularly  its  military
apparatus, was further crippled by the sanctions imposed from 1992 onwards after the 1988
Lockerbie  bombing[CITATION  Cor02  \l  1040  ].  Looking  at  military  expenditures  and
capabilities, Anthony H Cordesman defined the situation in the Maghreb as “A tragedy of
Arms”[CITATION Cor02 \n  \l 1040 ]. The expansion of the armed forces in the region did
not really follow a military logic: growing employment in the armies was seen as a way to
reduce unemployment and exercise domestic control rather than a way to improve the quality
of the armed forces. The situation in the Levant-Gulf region at the beginning of the civil war
was rather different.  The Levant-Gulf region is home to some big economic and military
powers: looking just at some of the main actors, the GDP of Turkey in 2010 was over $
700bn and its year GDP growth at about 9 per cent, Iran’s was close to $ 500bn and its GDP
growth at  per cent,  Saudi Arabia’s GDP over $ 500bn and its  growth about 4,8 per cent
(Morocco at the same time had a total GDP of less than $ 100bn and a growth of around 3,6
per cent, Libya $ 75bn and 5 per cent)[CITATION Wor15 \l 1040 ]. Furthermore, the military
capabilities of actors in the Levant/Gulf region are far superior to the ones in the Maghreb by
just  about  every  indicator:  from military  expenditures  on  the  GDP (where  Middle  East
countries  rank  among  the  highest  spenders  in  the  world)  to  size  of  the  armies,  up  to
technologies and expertise. 
 The geographical features of the two civil wars (and of the countries where they took place)
were also radically different. Algeria is Africa’s largest country with an area of approximately
2,4 mill. Km2[ CITATION Col161 \l 1040 ]. It’s territory is covered by large desert areas to its south and
the imposing Atlas mountains to its West. This geographical feature effectively “isolated” the
country by making more complex for powers such as Morocco or Libya to influence the
outcome of  the  conflict.  Syria  is  a  much smaller  country,  with  a  size  of  about  200,000
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Km2[CITATION Col161 \l 1040 ]. Its borders are more “accessible” than the ones of Algeria; furthermore
the unstable situation in neighbouring Iraq made it easy to introduce weapons, goods and
fighters through the border[ CITATION Ara121 \l 1040 ]. Similarly, Turkey’s border policies
played a central role in the external support of domestic opposition.     
Regional actors in the Maghreb had lower technological, economic and military resources
than actors in the Levant/Gulf. Furthermore the geopolitical conditions in Algeria made it
hard for regional actors to influence the development of the civil war, while in Syria they
facilitated effective external influence.       
Regional dynamics
“Regional dynamics” is the second factor of regional involvement.  8.This study focuses in
particular on the nature of the relation among key regional actors by using the categories of
homogeneous and heterogeneous systems developed by Raymond Aron. The French author
maintains that ideas and emotions influence state behaviour [CITATION Aro66 \p 99 \n  \t  \l
1040 ]. The French author resorts to the idea of heterogeneous and homogeneous systems.
This concept is defined as: ‘reciprocal recognition (or lack) of legitimacy among the actors
in the system’[CITATION Aro66 \p 100 \n  \t  \l 1040 ]. Homogeneous systems are those in
which key actors share the same ideological and political  values.  In other terms, when a
system is  homogeneous,  states  recognize  each other’s  legitimacy,  whilst  often  remaining
rivals9.  Heterogeneous systems on the other hand are those where key actors do not agree on
8This paper does not focus on regional polarity specifically. This does not mean that polarity is not an important
factor. Yet polarity is rather more useful when explaining “how” regional powers will get involved rather than 
why.  The case of bipolar and multipolar regions provides a good example. Regional involvement in multipolar 
systems is more flexible than in bipolar regions: the different poles of power will interact with local actors and 
favour the creation of a more fluid situation on the ground. While bipolarity will tend to “compact” the warring 
parties in two fronts, multipolarity will have the opposite effect of creating fragmentation on the ground.  
9A similar argument is put forward by the ontological threat literature; see for example Mirzen,  Ontological 
Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma, European Jouran of International Relations 
(Volume 12, Issue 3, 2006). 
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the  shared  norms regulating  the  system and do not  recognise  each other’s  legitimacy as
members of the system.
States in heterogeneous systems perceive a civil war as a threat to their position or a chance
to improve their position at the expense of their rivals: they will therefore be more likely to
get involved by supporting one of the sides. In heterogeneous systems states will project their
rivalries on the civil war. Homogeneous systems on the other hand put less pressure than
heterogeneous ones on actors to get involved in civil wars. States in homogeneous systems
will not perceive the conflict through the lens of competition, and will be more likely to avoid
getting  involved  in  the  development  of  the  civil  war  or  (when  they  do)  address  the
developments of the civil war jointly. 
While both Syria and Algeria are part of the wider MENA region, they are located in different
sub-regions.  As  Buzan  and  Waever[CITATION  Buz05  \n   \l  1040  ] note,  the  Maghreb
progressively  developed  its  own  security  dynamics  separate  from  the  Levant/Gulf  sub-
regions. Regional actors always maintained their relations with the wider Arab world, but the
security themes and patterns in the Maghreb were by the 80s mostly different from the ones
in the rest of the Middle East[CITATION Buz05 \l 1040 ]. For the purpose of this study we
will therefore refer to Maghreb and Levant/Gulf (or Middle East) sub-regions. Algeria is one
of the central actors in the Maghreb: this sub-region is also composed of Morocco, Tunisia,
Libya and Western Sahara, Morocco and Algeria being the two main regional powers with a
long history of tensions and conflict[CITATION Buz05 \l 1040 ]. In the aftermath of Algerian
independence  clashes  erupted  in  the  contested  Tindrouf  area.  In  the  70s  it  was  Algerian
support of the Polisario front that caused frictions between the two powers, with Algerian and
Moroccan forces  clashing in  Western  Sahara  in  1976[CITATION Cor02 \p  60 \l  1040 ].
Despite  its  earlier  support for the Sahrawian cause,  by the 80s Algeria appeared to have
accepted Moroccan de facto annexation of the region and this acknowledgment allowed for a
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significant improvement in Moroccan-Algerian relations. Qaddafi’s Libya represents a third
potential pole of power. Its aggressive posture had mainly manifested itself with the country’s
involvement in the Chadian civil war. Libya, sharing a long border with the country, had been
a long term ally of the Algerian regime (despite  some ups and downs caused mainly by
Qaddafi’s aggressive posture towards Tunisia). By the late 80s the relations among regional
actors had generally improved, as confirmed by the formation of the Arab Maghreb Union
(AMU). These developments were closely connected to the rise of the EU’s influence in the
region. The regional subsystem appeared to progressively transition towards a higher degree
of homogeneity. Zoubir maintains that relations between Algeria and Morocco went through
a series of ups and downs during the 90s[CITATION Zou05 \l 1040 ], yet without reaching
the levels of conflict of the 60s and 70s.  While the regimes that compose it are radically
different in terms of structure and ideology, the change in the relations between Algeria and
Morocco (the mutual acceptance of the other’s role as a legitimate actor within the system) in
particular makes the system more homogeneous than other regions. In a homogeneous system
such as the Maghreb, regional actors are less likely to compete over the development of a
civil war, and therefore not get involved. 
The Levant/Gulf system is radically different from the Maghreb in terms regional dynamics.
The  Levant/Gulf  is  a  multipolar  system,  where  several  actors  have  similar  or  at  least
comparable  levels  of  military,  economic  and  cultural  power,  whilst  being  significantly
superior  to  any  of  the  other  actors.  The  Levant/Gulf  is  a  region  of  aspiring  and  failed
hegemons,  one  where  several  actors  compete  over  the  regional  hierarchy[CITATION
Faw13  \t   \l  1040  ].   The  region  is  a  heterogeneous  system  where  the  key  actors  are
profoundly  different  and do  not  share  an  understanding  of  the  fundamental  rules  of  the
system  itself[CITATION  Aro66  \l  1040  ].  Regional  dynamics  are  characterized  by  the
presence of rivalries such as the “Gulf Cold war” between Iran on one side and Saudi Arabia
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and the Gulf States on the other.  In a multipolar heterogeneous region like the Levant/Gulf,
the  outbreak  of  a  civil  war  will  be  perceived  by  regional  actors  as  a  factor  of  further
competition. States will be more likely to get involved in order to pursue their agendas and
prevent other regional actors from exploiting the situation.
The  Levant/Gulf  and  Maghreb  regions  score  quite  differently  on  the
“heterogeneity/homogeneity”  ladder.  The  Maghreb  region  progressively  became  more
homogeneous in particular with the improvement of the Algerian-Moroccan relations from
the  late  70s  onwards.  The  Levant/Gulf  region  on  the  other  hand  remained  extremely
heterogeneous,  a  “region of  conflict”.    The start  of  a  civil  war  in  the Levant/Gulf  was
therefore perceived through the frame of competition in the Gulf-Levant, with regional actors
seeking to exploit the conflict in order to strengthen their position or prevent the regional
rivals from doing so. On the other hand, in a more homogeneous region such as the Maghreb
this “regional competition” aspect is less significant.      
Country’s relevance
Country’s relevance represents the importance that the country has in regional politics. This
could be described as “geopolitical relevance”: a country’s centrality in the region, its control
or access to strategic areas (such as a strait or a mountain) or important resources. Regional
actors will normally be more inclined to try to influence the outcome of a civil war (whether
by supporting one of the parties, trying to end the conflict or simply to limit it) if this country
is  “strategic” or  has significant  resources.  This factor  also includes  a  country’s  symbolic
value. This concept is rather harder to define: it  refers to the idea that some countries or
territories will have a relevance or prestige not ascribable to tangible assets such as resources.
This could be because the country is an integral part of the alliances system in the region, or
it derives from aspects such as historical relevance or presence of religious or cultural sites.
The introduction of country’s relevance might seem to be redundant, for the fact that regional
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actors are more likely to get involved in a civil war taking place in an “important” country
rather than in a peripheral one might seem obvious. Yet it is important to keep in mind that
involvement in civil wars - even indirectly - has its cost. The most obvious aspect of this is
the money and resource cost that a state has to invest in order to support a warring party. But
involvement  in  a  civil  war  also  has  political  costs:  states  invest  “diplomatic  capital”  in
support of one of the factions and also expose themselves to the risk of retaliation or even
escalation of the conflict. States therefore will get involved in a civil war in a significant way
only when they reckon that the potential costs and risks of it are worth taking.    
Syria and Algeria are important countries in their sub-regions and regions, but for different
reasons. Algeria is a relevant country from the geopolitical point of view, and particularly
important for its  resources. It  is  the 6th largest gas-exporter in the world and is currently
estimated to have the 10th largest reserves in the world[ CITATION CIA15 \l 1040 ]. It also
ranks 16th in the world in oil resources. Syria by contrast is far less resource rich: its crude
reserves are less than one fifth of Algeria’s, its natural gas reserves are less than 350 billion to
Algeria’s 4, 5 trillion cubic meters[ CITATION CIA15 \l 1040 ]. Yet if we look at the wider
region, in the highly symbolic realm of Arab politics[CITATION Bar98 \l 1040 ], Algeria is
rather peripheral if compared to Syria and the Levant. The “religious” centres of the region
are located in the Gulf (Mecca and Medina)  or the Levant (Jerusalem), the great historical
cities of the Arab world in the Levant (Damascus, Baghdad, Jerusalem itself) or in Egypt
(Cairo)10. The centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Arab and Middle Eastern politics has
further increased Syria’s relevance: not only is the country  a “border state”, but it was also
perceived as the main obstacle to Israel’s dominance since the aftermath of the Camp David
Accords between the Jewish state and Egypt in 1979. Syria, the “beating heart of the Arab
nation”, has been a central actor in inter-Arab politics. Furthermore, Syria was (and is) a key
10 This symbolic relevance is even more central if the concept of external involvement is stretched to include 
the flow of individuals and small groups. 
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member of the so called “Axis of resistance”, closely aligned to Iran and Hezbollah. Within
the framework of the “Gulf Cold War” between Iran and the Gulf states, Syria represented an
asset to the pro-Iranian alliance. The start of the uprising in Syria was therefore perceived as
an opportunity by the Gulf countries, and as a threat by Iran and its allies. Unsurprisingly,
both sides got involved in the conflict very quickly.  
Despite Algeria’s wealth of resources, Syria is undoubtedly a more relevant country from a
strategic and symbolic point of view. This is due to its geographic and strategic centrality, its
relevance within the regional alliances framework but also its symbolic value. This centrality
contributes to explaining regional involvement in the Syrian case.   
Security Issues and Containment
Regional security issues and containment refers to whether the civil war causes threats that
regional actors expect to spill over beyond the national borders. When the risk of spill-over is
low, regional actors are more likely to ignore it rather than get involved. Regional security
threats can be of varying natures, ranging from a danger to vital regional resources to the rise
of  a  rebel  group  that  could  threaten/target  neighbouring  states,  up  to  the  threat  of  state
collapse  and  fragmentation  that  could  alter  the  stability  of  the  state  system.  As  outlined
before,  security  issues  are  mostly regional  concerns:  “insecurity  is  often  associated  with
proximity.. security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside such
complexes than between states inside the complex and those outside it”[CITATION Buz05 \p
46 \l 1040 ] Regional involvement will depend greatly on whether regional actors expect the
security threats to remain contained within the country where the civil war is taking place or
to affect other regional actors. 
The threats to regional security and stability arising from the Algerian and Syrian civil war
were different in nature and scale. The presence of irredentist groups in different countries
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represents a potential  threat as these groups could take advantage of the civil  war to put
forward their claims. Algeria has a significant Berber population like neighbouring Morocco.
The presence of minority groups with potential secessionist aspirations represents a typical
trans-national security issue. But, as Roberts outlines, the Berber population was not a key
factor in the civil  war as the Islamists  essentially  failed to gain support  from minorities,
particularly  from the  Berber  population.  As  Roberts  shows,  the  Berbers  either  remained
indifferent  to  the  revolt,  or  in  the  case  of  the  Kabylia  region,  opposed  it  altogether
[CITATION Rob02 \p 129 \n  \l 1040 ].
While the Berber population had regularly voiced its concerns with its treatment (including
the  1980  “Berber  Spring”  protests),  these  protests  remained  separate  from  the  Islamist
protests and at no stage did the Berbers appear willing to exploit the crisis in the country to
push a separatist agenda11. On the other hand in the Syrian case, the presence of a Kurdish
population represented a threat to some regional actors from the early phases of the conflict.
Syria’s Kurdish population (between 7 and 10 per cent of the whole population according to
most  estimates)  has  historical  and  political  links  with  the  bigger  Kurdish  population  in
neighbouring  Iraq  and  particularly  Turkey.  Turkey’s  concern  with  the  Kurdish  issue  is
confirmed  by  the  early  references  to  this  problem:  then  foreign  minister  Davutoglu  in
October  2011  already  intimated  Syria  to  “not  even  think  to  incite  Turkey’s
Kurds”[ CITATION Den11 \l 1040 ]. Due to its effective military forces, the YPG has been
able to carve a large Syrian enclave in the north of the country. Kurdish militias have also
proved  to  be  the  most  effective  militias  in  the  fight  against  Islamist  groups,  and  have
therefore  been  working  closely  with  the  American-led  Western coalition.  The  growing
Kurdish control has alarmed the authorities in Turkey: Ankara’s intervention in July 2015 has
11 Laemont in “Islam and the politics of resistance in Algeria” show how the Berber community had already felt




been framed within the fight against ISIS rhetoric, but has so far targeted mainly Kurdish
forces. 
The presence of groups or  militias  with a  regional  agenda can also represent  a  threat  to
regional actors. The Islamist forces in Algeria and Syria were quite different. The relative
isolation  of  Algerian  Islamists  played  a  role  in  limiting  the  potential  spread  of  security
threats. Roberts’[CITATION Rob02 \n  \t  \l 1040 ] study shows how the Algerian Islamist
movement  that  was  involved  in  the  civil  war  developed  essentially  as  a  reaction  to  the
country’s  Revolution Socialiste of the Boumedienne regime. The movement was from the
outset more domestic-focused than other Islamist forces that developed in other parts of the
Arab world. Algerian Islamists’ main target was therefore taking over (initially by democratic
and later by military means) the state rather than “global Jihad”. This made them naturally
less  threatening to  other  regional  regimes.  The Syrian case is  rather  less straightforward.
Regional  actors  favoured  the  growth  of  Islamist  militias  in  the  hope  that  they  would
contribute  to  the  ousting of  President  Bashar  Al-Assad.  The role  of  Islamist  forces  soon
became  very  important,  but  initially  their  goals  were  domestic  rather  than  regional  and
international. This rapidly changed with the establishment and development of jihadi groups.
Yet itt was only with the expansion of the Islamic state in Syria and Iraq that states in the
region and beyond perceived the threat to the regional system stemming from the Syrian
conflict.  
In the case of Algeria, the nature of the opposition to the regime together with the lack of
minority “break-up” risk made the civil war less threatening to regional actors. In the Syrian
case on the other hand the threat of state collapse (based partially on the involvement of
irredentist minority groups in the conflict) represented a driver for regional involvement. The
presence of “transnational” insurgency groups in the Syrian case (together with the frailty of
some of the neighbouring countries) suggested that the conflict was harder to contain within
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the borders of the country.  It  is  nonetheless important to remember how regional powers
contributed (inadvertently or not) to the creation of an “international jihadi opposition”. 
Domestic-external links
The presence of strong links between external and domestic actors is an important factor in
regional  involvement  in  civil  wars.  Domestic-external  links  refer  to  networks  between
domestic actors and external parties - whether states or other non-state actors. This can range
from formal  alliances  between the  regime and regional  states  to  ideological  or  religious
affiliations between domestic groups and external actors. Domestic actors will  be able to
exploit links to obtain support from their regional allies. Regional actors will be more prone
to intervene in the civil war in order to support or protect their domestic allies when these
links  exist.  This  could be because they perceive that  their  defeat  will  result  in  a  loss of
position for them, or because there will be pressure from domestic actors towards supporting
the party involved in the civil war. Therefore, when domestic-external links exist and are
significant, regional involvement in civil wars is more likely to happen.  
The domestic-external links in the Syrian and Algerian cases were radically different. Firstly,
there are significant differences in the relation between the opposition forces and outside
forces  in  the  two  cases.  As  outlined  in  the  previous  section,  in  the  Algerian  case  the
opposition force were rather insulated from external influence. The return of fighters from
Afghanistan  contributed  to  a  radicalization  the  Algerian  movement,  but  despite  this  the
Algerian Islamist forces remained remarkably disconnected from other similar movements in
the region. Willis shows how the Islamists groupings in Algeria received less founding and
supporting from outside sources than their counterparts in Egypt or Tunisia, and even the
Muslim  Brotherhood  had  less  connections  with  its  sister  groups  in  other  Arab
countries[CITATION Wil96 \p 94 \l 1040 ].
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The Iranian revolution undoubtedly influenced the development of the Islamist forces that
were later to face the regime in the country’s civil war, as it did in the case of several other
Islamist  movements.  The  success  of  an  Islamist  movement  able  to  overturn  what  was
considered the most  stable  pro-Western  regime in the  MENA region clearly  inspired  the
Islamist forces in Algeria[CITATION Wil96 \l 1040 ]. Yet despite President Chadli’s direct
reference to the role of Ayatollah Khomeini in the aftermath of the 1982 unrest, there appears
to be little or no sign of direct links between Algerian Islamist and the Iranian leadership at
this stage[CITATION Wil96 \p 91 \l 1040 ]. The isolation of the Algerian Islamists appears to
be  an  exception  within  the  Arab  world.  In  the  case  of  Syria,  opposition  forces  clearly
appeared to have more developed links to external powers. Hokayem[CITATION Hok13 \n  \l
1040 ]  points out that the traditional opposition, the one that had longer established networks
with external powers, was initially surprised by the start of the uprising and did not play a
central role. The uprising started mainly at grassroots level by local activists that had little or
no connection with external powers. The traditional opposition, whether Islamist (such as the
by and large exiled Muslim Brotherhood leadership) or secular (both inside and outside the
country), struggled to gain control over the revolt. The Syrian National Council and later the
National Coalition can be seen as an attempt to channel the domestic uprising in a precise
political direction. The leadership of these coalitions also had long established networks with
regional actors, networks that were used to gather support from them[ CITATION Hok13 \l
1040 ].    
The regional relations of the two regimes also played an important role. As outlined before,
the Syrian regime is a central member of the “Axis of Resistance” that opposes American and
Israeli influence in the region. Iran and Syria have one of the longest established alliances in
the region[ CITATION Goo13 \l 1040 ]. This close relation led to an early involvement of
Iran and its allies (and particularly Hezbollah) in favour of the Syrian regime. The central
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position of Syria in the regional web of alliances undoubtedly increased regional involvement
in the civil war. The Algerian regime had been since independence an important player in
regional politics: Algeria joined the Arab League in 1962 and had the main “Arab Progressive
Republic” in the Maghreb. With the decline of Pan-Arabism from 1973 onwards, the links
among these countries loosened. As Akacem[CITATION Aka05 \n  \t   \l  1040 ] outlines,
Algeria  had  developed  an  important  role  within  the  Non-Aligned  movement  and  the
Organization of African Unity, developing close relations with states outside the Maghreb
region. While the Algerian regime had, at the beginning of the civil war, close links with
several regional actors, it could not enjoy the same close relations that its Syrian counterpart
did.
 In  the  case  of  Syria,  both  regime  and  opposition  had  longer  established relations  with
external actors than in the Algerian one.  These relations played a central role in the different
degrees of external involvement in the two civil wars. The links existing between the Syrian
regime  and  Iran  and  Hezbollah  were  particularly  strong,  and  proved  to  be  crucial  in




Why do regional powers get involved in civil wars? The comparative analysis of the Algerian
and Syrian  civil  wars  carried  out  in  the previous  section clarifies  several  aspects  of  this
complex phenomenon.
Table 1
 The factors elaborated all  contributed to regional involvement in civil  wars,  although in
different ways. The first aspect, regional capabilities, can be conceptualized as a precondition
for regional involvement. When regional actors do not have the economic, technological and
military capabilities to influence the outcome of a civil war, their involvement is not possible
(or not significant). Looking at the two case studies, regional actors in the Levant/Gulf have
comparatively higher capabilities than states in the Maghreb during the Algerian civil war.
Furthermore the geopolitical differences between the two countries where the conflict took
place made it easier for regional actors to influence the Syrian civil war than the Algerian
one.   Yet actors in the Maghreb region would have undoubtedly had the capacity to influence
the  conflict  more  than  they  did.  Regional  capabilities  therefore  explain  lack  of  regional
involvement  (when they are  very  low),  but  on their  own do not  explain  why and when
regional actors do get involved in a civil war. 
The other factors analysed concur to explain why and when regional actors will get involved.
The effects  of regional dynamics on regional involvement are clear when we look at  the
Syrian and Algerian cases. The start of a civil war in the Levant/Gulf region was seen by the
key actors as a factor of further competition: regional states projected their regional agendas
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on the Syrian arena. On the other hand in the more homogeneous Maghreb region the civil
war was considered more of a domestic issue. Furthermore, Syria and Algeria had different
relevance in their respective sub-regions and in the broader MENA region. It is interesting to
notice  how here  symbolic  relevance  appears  to  be  more  influential  than  the  presence  of
resources. While Algeria is much richer than Syria in terms of material resources, the Levant
country appears to have a much bigger specific weight in less tangible aspects. Syria has a
central role in the regional web of alliances, being a central member of the so called “Axis of
Resistance”  and  closely  aligned  to  regional  powerhouse  Iran.  Furthermore,  the  symbolic
relevance of the “beating heart of the Arab nation”, a front line state in the struggle against
Israel, pushed regional actors to get involved in the Syrian civil war. A regime change in
Syria threatened to alter the regional balance more than one in Algeria would have done,
prompting key regional actors to intervene in order to influence the outcome of the civil war. 
The risk of security spill-over within the region is also an effective factor of involvement. In
the case of Syria, the first threat to the stability of the system came from the role of separatist
groups, and particularly the Kurdish YPG. The emergence of “radical” groups that could
represent a threat to regional actors represents another potential security threat emerging from
a civil war, but in this case the score is less clear. It is evident from the existing literature that
the Islamist forces fighting in Algeria were more domestically-oriented and had more of a
national  agenda,  while  the  Islamist  forces  fighting  in  Syria  have  a  more  “global  Jihadi”
ideology. Yet this  is also a result  of the role of regional actors that favoured the flow of
foreign  Jihadis  in  the  hope  of  using  them  to  topple  the  Syrian  regime,  a  strategy  that
eventually resulted in the emergence of forces that represented a regional threat. Finally, the
presence of more robust domestic/external links in the Syrian than in the Algerian case led to
more  regional  involvement.  In  this  case  the  sectarian  aspect  appears  to  have  played  a
particularly  relevant  role.  The  regime  had  strong  and  long  established  connections  with
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regional  state  and  non-state  actors,  such  as  Iran  and  Hezbollah:  these  actors  played  an
important role in supporting regime forces throughout the civil war. At the start of the Syrian
civil war, the “traditional” opposition appeared to be surprised by the sudden development of
events, but it gained a higher degree of centrality as the conflict continued. This opposition
had strong links to external actors, links that were used to obtain support from external actors.
In the case of Algeria, the regime had, comparatively, weaker links to external actors. While
the Algerian regime had been a member of the Steadfastness front that had opposed Egypt’s
reconciliation with Israel, it could not boast as close links to key regional actors as its Syrian
counterpart. The opposition showed a level of isolation from other movements that appeared
to be rather exceptional in the Arab world.           
Conclusion
This article has analysed the central yet under-researched issue of regional involvement in
civil wars. Most of the existing literature on civil wars maintains that regional involvement
affects the development and potential solutions of civil wars. Despite this near consensus on
the importance of regional involvement, the topic is rather unexplored in the literature. This
study addresses this gap by carrying out a comparative analysis of the Algerian civil war
(1991-2002)  and  the  current  Syrian  civil  war.  Based  on  this  comparative  analysis,  it
developed five factors of regional involvement: capabilities, regional structure and dynamics,
country’s relevance, regional security issues/containment and domestic-external links. These
factors proved to be effective in explaining the different degree of involvement of regional
actors in the Algerian and Syrian civil wars. They do nonetheless have “different” effects on
the potential for regional involvement. Military capabilities are a pre-condition for regional
involvement, for in the cases when states do not have sufficient resources they will not get
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involved civil wars. The other aspects analysed all contribute to regional involvement in civil
wars, showing that this phenomenon is a result of both the specific patterns of development
of the conflict within the country and of regional features.   
The main contribution of this research is adding to the literature on the relation between civil
wars and regional security. This paper offered a more systemic view of the phenomenon of
region  involvement  in  civil  wars:  several  studies  on  the  topic  focus  on  rather  narrow
typologies of civil wars (such as ethnic conflict). The use of a comparative and qualitative
method and only two case studies allowed to focus in depth on some specific features of
regional involvement. This study showed that there is undoubtedly great potential for further
research in this area. A topic so central yet understudied as the one analysed by this research
would also benefit from analysis carried out using different research methods and techniques.
A broader comparative analysis, looking at a bigger set of case studies, would complement
the research carried out by this paper. The inclusion of FPA level analysis appears to be an
important  step  for  further  research.  States’  specific  goals  are  undoubtedly  central  in
understanding regional involvement in civil wars. The relation between global and regional
dimensions and how it contributes to explaining regional involvement in civil wars is another
related area with great potential for future research. Finally,  the involvement of non-state
actors represents a separate (yet related) topic that could be analysed by a further research
paper. The flow of groups and individual fighters has differed significantly in some of the
recent civil wars (including the two case studies analysed here), and the reasons for this are
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Syria           High Heterogeneous      High   High Strong
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